

# Session Handover among Fog Devices using Polynomials

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## ABSTRACT

In the past, authentication and authorization issues were not considered especially in the context of Fog computing. They were discussed in the context of machine-to-machine and smart grids communications. The employable authentication and authorization techniques in Fog computing have been discussed earlier. However, they may not be appropriate for Fog computing as none of them have discussed the facility of session handover among registered fog devices. If due to some problem/unavailability/down of fog devices, any user desires to switch the present fog device then they were not allowed to migrate among all registered fog devices. This study proposes a session handover scheme among fog devices using Lagrange Interpolating Polynomial. Use of Lagrange Interpolating Polynomial instead of costly, time-consuming exponential computation makes it feasible for practical implementation. If due to some problem, any user desires to switch the present fog device then our scheme allows him/her to migrate among all registered fog devices.

**Keywords:** Attacks, Authentication, Fog devices, Interpolation, Password, PFS, Security, Smart Card.

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## INTRODUCTION

Fog processing is proposed to resolve the issue related with Cloud registering worldview to fulfill the need of portability support, area mindfulness and low inactivity.<sup>[1]</sup> As Fog registering is executed at the edge of the organization, it offers exceptionally low dormancy, area mindfulness with worked on Quality-of-Services (QoS) for ongoing applications. In the Fog worldview, verification of imparting parties is essential. In any case, single element verification isn't adequate. Accordingly, two element verification plans were proposed and suggested by various creators. In this unique circumstance, Chang and Wu.<sup>[2]</sup> proposed a confirmation conspire in view of passwords which kills the job of check table to endure every one of the expected assaults. These secret key based brilliant card validation plans are additionally ordered into two significant classes: timestamp based and nonce based.<sup>[3]</sup> In any case, it is shown that these plans have inadequacies.<sup>[4,5]</sup> To lessen the clock synchronization execution cost, nonce based plans have been recommended.<sup>[6,7]</sup> As of late, verification in view of shrewd card has been sent constantly in various parched regions like distributed computing,<sup>[8]</sup> medical care,<sup>[9]</sup> key trade in IPTV broadcasting,<sup>[10]</sup> remote organizations,<sup>[11]</sup> multi-server validation,<sup>[12]</sup> and remote sensor networks.<sup>[13]</sup> Consequently, it is important to deal with recognized potential assaults alongside all security prerequisites related with secret word based savvy card validation plans.<sup>[14]</sup>

Before, the issues connected with confirmation and approval were not viewed as particularly with regards to Fog

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registering. They were talked about with regards to machine-to-machine<sup>[15]</sup> and shrewd lattices correspondences.<sup>[16]</sup> The verification and approval strategies that can be utilized in Fog figuring have been talked about before at the same time, not a solitary one of them have examined the office of meeting relocation among enlisted haze gadgets. In the event that in light of some issue/inaccessibility, any client wants to switch the current mist gadget then he/she has not been permitted to move among all enlisted haze gadgets.

The remainder of this paper is coordinated as follows. Section 2 presents the proposed brilliant card based meeting movement conspire among haze gadgets. Section 3 finishes up the paper.

## Smart Card based Session Handover Scheme among Fog devices

The notations/symbols used in this paper are given in Table 1.

**Table 1:** Symbols with their meaning


Notations	Their Meaning
FD	Fog Devices
CAS	Cloud Authentication Server
x	Secret key of CAS
P	Large prime number
$\mathbb{Z}_P^*$	Primitive element in $\mathbb{Z}_P^*$
ID,PW	Identity and password chosen by User
$ID_1, ID_2, \dots, ID_m$	Identity of 'm' FDs that user wants to register
$VT_i$	Validity time period of FD $i$
$h(\bullet)$	Secure one way hash function
$E_k(\bullet)$	Encryption operation using key $k$

he/she wants to register  $(ID_1, ID_2, \dots, ID_m)$ , computes  $h(PW)$  and submits  $\{ID, h(PW), ID_1, ID_2, \dots, ID_m\}$  to the CAS. After receiving the registration request from user, the CAS computes  $CID = h(ID||x)$ ,  $V_1 = h(CID||h(PW))$ ,  $S_i = g^{(ID_i \times x)} \bmod P$ ,  $1 \leq i \leq m$  and constructs the lagrange interpolating polynomial

$$F(X) = \sum_{j=1}^m (VT_j) \frac{(X - ID)}{(S_j - ID)} \times \prod_{j=1, j \neq k}^m \frac{(X - S_j)}{(S_k - S_j)} + h(PW) \prod_{l=1}^m$$

$$= C_m X^m + C_{m-1} X^{m-1} + C_{m-2} X^{m-2} + \dots + C_1 X + C_0$$

CAS issues a smart card over secure channel to user by storing  $\{CID, V_1, S_1, S_2, \dots, S_m, h(\bullet), E(\bullet), F(X), P\}$  into smart card memory.



**Figure 1:** Login and Authentication phase of our proposed session handover scheme

The proposed scheme consists of three stages:

- Registration,
- Login and Verification and
- Session handover/switch

**Registration Phase**

In this phase, user selects **ID, PW** and IDs of 'm' FDs which

**Login and Verification Phase**

In this phase, user inserts his/hersmart card into the card reader and keys in **ID** and **PW**. After this, the smart card computes  $V_1' = h(CID||h(PW))$  and verifies whether the value of stored  $V_1$  and computed  $V_1'$  are equal or not (Figure 1). If it is true, then the user is the genuine and legitimate




Figure 2: Session Handover/Switch phase of our proposed session handover scheme

bearer of smart card. After this, the smart card generates a random nonce  $N_1$ , computes  $V_2 = (\prod_{i=1}^m S_i)^{N_1} \bmod P$ ,  $V_2 = g^{\sum_{i=1}^m \text{ID}_i \times N_1} \bmod P$ ,  $F(i)$ ,  $1 \leq i \leq m$ ,  $F(V_2)$  and sends the login request  $M_1 = \{\text{ID}, F(i), 1 \leq i \leq m, F(V_2), V_1, V_2\}$  to the CAS. Upon receiving the login request  $M_1 = \{\text{ID}, F(i), 1 \leq i \leq m, F(V_2), V_1, V_2\}$ ; CAS first checks the validity of  $\text{ID}$  to accept/reject the login request. If true, CAS computes  $V_2' = (V_2)^x \bmod P$ .

**Theorem 1** The CAS can get  $V_2 = (\prod_{i=1}^m S_i)^{N_1} \bmod P$  using received  $V_2$  and its secretly stored key 'x'.

**Proof** After getting  $V_2$  from the received login request  $M_1 = \{\text{ID}, F(i), 1 \leq i \leq m, F(V_2), V_1, V_2\}$ ; CAS can compute  $V_2'$  by using its own secret key 'x' as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} V_2' &= (V_2)^x \bmod P \\ &= \left( g^{\sum_{i=1}^m \text{ID}_i \times N_1} \right)^x \bmod P \\ &= \left( g^{\text{ID}_1 \times N_1 + \text{ID}_2 \times N_1 + \dots + \text{ID}_m \times N_1} \right)^x \bmod P \\ &= \left( g^{(\text{ID}_1 + \text{ID}_2 + \dots + \text{ID}_m) N_1 \times x} \right) \bmod P \\ &= \left( g^{(\text{ID}_1 \times x + \text{ID}_2 \times x + \dots + \text{ID}_m \times x) N_1} \right) \bmod P \end{aligned}$$

**User/SC Terminal/CAS**

Insert SC and keys in  $\text{ID}$  and  $\text{PW}$

$$M_1 = \{\text{ID}, F(i), 1 \leq i \leq m, F(V_2), V_1, V_2\}$$

$$M_2 = \{V_4, N_2\}$$

$$M_3 = \{V_5\}$$

$$\begin{aligned} &= ((g^{\text{ID}_1 \times x}) \times (g^{\text{ID}_2 \times x}) \times \dots \times (g^{\text{ID}_m \times x}))^{N_1} \bmod P \\ &= (\prod_{i=1}^m S_i)^{N_1} \bmod P \end{aligned}$$

Using these  $m+1$  points  $\{(1, F(1)), \{2, F(2)\}, \{3, F(3)\}, \dots, \{m, F(m)\}, \{V_2', F(V_2')\}$

CAS reconstructs original interpolation polynomial

$F(X) = C_m X^m + C_{m-1} X^{m-1} + C_{m-2} X^{m-2} + \dots + C_1 X + C_0$  and finds  $h(\text{PW}')$  by calculating  $F(\text{ID}) = h(\text{PW}') \bmod P$ .

**Theorem 2** The CAS can get user's secret information  $h(\text{PW}')$  from the polynomial  $F(\text{ID})$ .

**Proof** After reconstructing the original polynomial  $F(X)$ , the CAS can get  $h(\text{PW}')$  as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} F(\text{ID}) &= \sum_{j=1}^m (VT_j) \frac{(\text{ID} - \text{ID})}{(S_j - \text{ID})} \times \prod_{j=1, j \neq k}^m \frac{(\text{ID} - S_j)}{(S_k - S_j)} + h(\text{PW}') \\ &\prod_{l=1}^m \frac{(\text{ID} - S_l)}{(\text{ID} - S_l)} \bmod P \\ F(\text{ID}) &= 0 \times \prod_{j=1, j \neq k}^m \frac{(\text{ID} - S_j)}{(S_k - S_j)} + h(\text{PW}') \times 1 \bmod P \\ F(\text{ID}) &= h(\text{PW}') \bmod P \end{aligned}$$

After computing  $h(\text{PW}')$ , CAS computes  $\text{CID} = h(\text{ID} || x)$

,  $V_1' = h(\text{CID} || h(\text{PW}'))$  and verifies whether it is equal to received  $V_1$  or not. If it is true, user is genuine. Now, CAS generates random nonce  $N_2$ , computes  $sk = (V_1')^{N_2} \bmod P$

,  $V_4 = h(sk || h(\text{PW}') || N_2)$  and sends the response message  $M_2 = \{V_4, N_2\}$  back to the user. Once the response message  $M_2 = \{V_4, N_2\}$  is received, smart card computes

$sk = (V_2)^{N_2} \bmod P$ ,  $V_4' = h(sk || h(\text{PW}') || N_2)$  and verifies whether it is equal to received  $V_4$  or not. If it holds, CAS is genuine and message is fresh else terminates the session.

Consequently, the smart card computes  $V_5 = h(sk)$  and sends  $M_3 = \{V_5\}$  to the CAS. Once received, CAS can easily verify it. Finally, mutual authentication is accomplished between user and CAS. Both the communicating parties settle upon a common shared session key

$sk = (V_2)^{N_2} = (\prod_{i=1}^m S_i)^{N_1 \times N_2} = (V_2')^{N_2} = (V_2)^{x \times N_2} \bmod P$

for further communication.



### Session Handover/ Switch Phase

If because of some problem, user desires to switch the present FD to FD<sup>n</sup> (1 ≤ n ≤ m) then the user computes  $V_6 = E_{sk}[ID_n]$  and sends particular FD's encrypted identity  $M_4 = \{V_6\}$  to the CAS. After receiving  $M_4$ , CAS decrypts it and gets real identity of the next communicating FD by computing  $D_{sk}[V_6] = ID_n$ . To check whether the FD<sup>n</sup> is valid or not, CAS computes  $S_n = g^{(ID_n \times x)} \text{ mod } P$  and  $F(S_n)$ .

$$F(S_n) = \sum_{j=1}^m (VT_j) \frac{(S_n - ID)}{(S_j - ID)} \times \prod_{j=1, j \neq k}^m \frac{(S_n - S_j)}{(S_k - S_j)} + h(PW)$$

$$\prod_{i=1}^m \frac{(S_n - S_i)}{(ID - S_i)} \text{ mod } P$$

$$h(PW) \prod_{i=1}^m \frac{(S_n - S_i)}{(ID - S_i)} \text{ mod } P = \frac{(S_n - S_n)}{(ID - S_n)} \times h(PW) \prod_{i=1, i \neq n}^m$$

$$\frac{(S_n - S_i)}{(ID - S_i)} \text{ mod } P = 0$$

If  $j \neq n$ , then

$$\prod_{j=1, j \neq k}^m \frac{(S_n - S_j)}{(S_k - S_j)} = \frac{(S_n - S_j)}{(S_n - S_j)} \times \prod_{j=1, j \neq k, j \neq n}^m \frac{(S_n - S_j)}{(S_k - S_j)}$$

$$\text{mod } P = 0$$

Hence,

$$F(S_n) = (VT_n) \frac{(S_n - ID)}{(S_n - ID)} \times \prod_{j=1, j \neq k}^m \frac{(S_n - S_j)}{(S_n - S_j)} + 0 \text{ mod } P$$

$$= (VT_n) \text{ mod } P$$

Finally, CAS verifies the validity time period of FD<sup>n</sup>. If it holds, CAS uses  $S_n$  as the next session key for FD<sup>n</sup>. As all the connected FDs were initially registered with the CAS, no need to again verify the authenticity of the FDs. Only a genuine FD can get the data coming from the CAS as it has the information about  $S_i$ , (1 ≤ i ≤ m) stored in its memory securely (Figure 2).

### CONCLUSION

In the past, the issues related to authentication and authorization were not considered especially in the context of Fog computing. They were discussed in the context of machine-to-machine and smart grids communications. The authentication and authorization techniques that can be used in Fog computing have been discussed earlier but, none of them have discussed the facility of session handover among registered fog devices. If because of some problem/unavailability, any user desires to switch the present fog device then they have not been allowed to switch among all registered fog devices.

This paper proposes a session handover scheme among fog devices using Lagrange Interpolating Polynomial. Use of Lagrange Interpolating Polynomial instead of costly, time-consuming exponential computation makes it feasible

for practical implementation. To handle the problem of synchronized clocks among between users's registered FDs and the CAS especially in large systems, random nonce is used instead of timestamp. The presented scheme provides the facilities through which CAS can efficiently verify the identity of user's registered FDs earlier than granting the privileges to access data from the CAS. As all the connected FDs were initially registered with the CAS, no need to again verify the authenticity of the registered FDs.

### User's Registered FD's CAS

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